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Abstract
We present a nonparametric approach for the equity and e¢ ciency evaluation of
(private and public) primary schools in Flanders. First, we use a nonparametric (Data
Envelopment Analysis) model that is specially tailored to assess educational e¢ ciency
at the pupil level. The model accounts for the fact that minimal prior structure is
typically available for the behavior (objectives and feasibility set) under evaluation, and
it reckons with outlier behavior in the available data, while it corrects for ￿ environmental￿
characteristics that are speci￿c to each pupil. Second, we propose ￿rst- and second-order
stochastic dominance (FSD and SSD) criteria as naturally complementary aggregation
criteria for comparing the performance of di⁄erent school types (private and public
schools) in Flanders. While FSD only accounts for (Pareto) e¢ ciency, SSD also takes
(Pigou-Dalton) equality into consideration. We ￿nd that private schools outperform
public schools in terms of SSD.
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1 Introduction
An important theme in policy evaluation is the question whether public funds are used in
an equitable and e¢ cient way. In the speci￿c context of education, the comparison between
private ￿ but, possibly, publicly funded￿ schools and public schools is at the heart of a
debate, which started with the work of Coleman et al. (1982). They ￿nd that (1) catholic
school students obtain higher standardized test scores than public school students (after
controlling for family background), and (2) catholic schools provide more equal educational
outcomes for minority students. Therefore, one could conclude that catholic schools were both
more e¢ cient and more equitable than public schools in the U.S. at that time. The work of
Coleman et al. was (and still is) controversial, not only in the public debate (see, e.g., the New
York Times articles of April 7, April 12 and April 26, 1981, discussing the consequences of
Coleman et al.￿ s results for the introduction of tuition tax credits and/or school vouchers), but
also in academics (see, e.g., Cain and Goldberger (1983) for a neat overview of methodological
problems). In spite of these criticisms, many studies have con￿rmed the outperformance of
public by private schools; see, e.g., the literature review in Altonji et al. (2005).
This study compares private and public primary schools in Flanders, i.e., a region in
Belgium, on the basis of both equity and e¢ ciency considerations. Our methodology con-
sists of two steps, a measurement and an aggregation step. The distinguishing feature is that
both steps are entirely nonparametric. First, we use a nonparametric e¢ ciency evaluation
model ￿ also called a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model￿ which is specially tailored
for environment-corrected educational e¢ ciency evaluation at the pupil level. Second, we
use nonparametric stochastic dominance techniques ￿ which allow us to take e¢ ciency and
equity considerations into account￿ to compare the aggregate performance of private and
public schools. While our focus is on comparing school types, this aggregation step could
alternatively be implemented e.g. for performance assessments at the school level. In addi-
tion, although our application focuses on education, we believe that the suggested method is
applicable in a wide variety of public sector settings (e.g., health services), which typically
involve not only e¢ ciency but also equity considerations.
To set the stage, we brie￿ y present the measurement and aggregation step in more detail
and relate them to the existing literature. We use a nonparametric DEA model to measure
educational e¢ ciency at the pupil level on the basis of test scores in mathematics and lan-
guage pro￿ciency (writing and reading in Dutch). We account for the inputs used (which the
policy makers do control) as well as for possibly diverging ￿ environmental￿variables ￿ socio-
economic status of parents and lagged test score results￿ that might a⁄ect pupil performance
(and which often fall beyond the control of policy makers and schools). DEA has the at-
2tractive feature that it imposes minimal a priori structure on the behavior (objectives and
feasibility set) that is evaluated. This is particularly convenient in the context of primary
education, where little a priori information is available; as such, the use of DEA minimizes
the risk of speci￿cation error.
DEA models have been used before to evaluate the educational e¢ ciency at the pupil
level; see, e.g., Grosskopf et al. (1997, 1999) and Portela and Thanassoulis (2001) and the
references therein. In the current study, we propose a DEA model that is specially designed
for educational e¢ ciency evaluation: while at the input side it uses the minimal ￿ free dis-
posability￿assumption (in casu, more input never leads to a lower (potential) performance),
at the output side it uses the linear aggregation that is typical for measuring pupil perfor-
mance in primary education (i.e., aggregate performance results are conventionally de￿ned
as weighted sums of the results in separate disciplines). Focusing on linearly aggregated
output, it measures educational ine¢ ciency in terms of the di⁄erence between the maximally
attainable output and the actually achieved output.
Two additional features of our DEA model are worth mentioning. First, it uses linear
output aggregation, but it allows for ￿ exible weights for the di⁄erent performance dimensions.
Essentially, such a ￿ exible weighting allows each pupil to be evaluated in terms of his/her
own ￿ most favorable￿weighting scheme, which accounts for ￿ specialization￿in education; we
avoid undesirable ￿ extreme￿specialization by limiting the range of possible output weights
through pre-speci￿ed bounds. Second, by suitably adapting the methodology of Daraio and
Simar (2005, 2007) to our DEA model, it can account for outlier behavior, while it also
allows us to explain observed performance di⁄erences in terms of diverging environmental
characteristics in a nonparametric way. The observed environmental impact as well as the
corresponding environment-corrected e¢ ciency results provide an easy-to-implement tool for
attention-direction in the political process.
Finally, we suggest ￿rst-order and second-order stochastic dominance criteria (also known
as, respectively, ￿ rank dominance￿and ￿ generalized Lorenz dominance￿in the normative wel-
fare literature) for comparing the aggregate performance of public and private schools; see,
e.g., Lambert (2001) and Levy (1992) for surveys of stochastic dominance criteria in the
welfare and risk literature, respectively. These criteria allow us to compare the social welfare
loss in public and private schools, i.e., the di⁄erence between the maximally attainable wel-
fare and the actual welfare of their pupils. We believe these criteria are particularly useful in
the context of DEA e¢ ciency evaluation of the public sector. First, they are nonparametric
in nature, which naturally complies with the nonparametric orientation of DEA. Next, the
second order stochastic dominance criterion considers not only aggregate (Pareto) e¢ ciency
but also expresses a concern for inequality, which is particularly relevant within the context
of public policy evaluation. As with DEA, these aggregation criteria are easy-to-implement,
which makes them attractive for practical applications.
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. The next section presents our research
3question. Section 3 discusses our methodology for evaluating educational e¢ ciency at the
individual pupil level. Section 4 presents the e¢ ciency results, with a main focus on envi-
ronmental e⁄ects. Section 5 discusses the aggregation of the individual e¢ ciencies. A ￿nal
section 6 summarizes our main conclusions.
2 Motivation
The general belief is that private (mainly catholic) schools in Flanders perform better (i.e.,
the cognitive output of their pupils is thought to be higher on average), but this statement
is somewhat blurred by two counteracting forces related to inputs and environment. While
private schools are said to have more pupils with an ￿ advantageous￿family background, they
must also receive less funding as a consequence of the ￿ Equal Educational Opportunities￿
programme of the Flemish government. In this section, we will de￿ne and describe the
inputs, outputs and environment in the Flemish educational system.
We use data from the SiBO-project, whose aim is to describe and explain di⁄erences in the
primary school curriculum of a cohort of Flemish pupils. The dataset consists of a reference
group, which is representative for the Flemish population of primary school pupils, and three
additional data sets: (1) all public city schools of the city of Ghent, (2) an oversampling
to get a su¢ cient number of schools with a high number of disadvantage pupils (pupils for
whom the schools get additional means in the so-called ￿ Equal Educational Opportunities￿
programme of the Flemish government) and (3) an oversampling to obtain a su¢ cient number
of non-traditional schools. We use all pupils together, while correcting for the sample￿ s non-
representative nature in our empirical e¢ ciency evaluation. This leaves us with 3413 pupils
(with complete data), of whom 1774 attend private catholic schools, 1039 local public schools
and 553 Flemish public schools. The remaining 47 pupils take classes in private non-catholic
schools. Although these pupils are taken into account to estimate ine¢ ciency scores later on,
we use the term private to refer to pupils in catholic private schools in the sequel.
We look at the cohort of pupils in their second year of primary education (2004-2005) ￿ at
the (normal) age of 7￿ while we use data from the same pupils in the ￿rst year (2003-2004)
to retrieve environmental variables. We extract 3 types of variables at the individual level,
called inputs, outputs and environmental variables in the sequel.
Financial inputs in primary schools mainly consist of salaries (80%) and operation costs
(20%). As we a priori assume that the di⁄erences in operation costs are unlikely to cause
di⁄erences in cognitive results, we only focus on inputs related to teaching. Government
assigns instruction units to pupils, which can be used by their respective schools to ￿nance
teachers: 24 instruction units correspond with a full-time teacher. The total number of
instruction units assigned to a particular pupil consists of regular and additional, so-called
￿ equal educational opportunity￿(EEO), instruction units. Regular (per-capita) instruction
units (REG) are, roughly speaking, the same for all pupils, as they are divided among schools
4on the basis of a scale which is approximately linear in the number of pupils. The additional
EEO instruction units depend on certain ￿ disadvantageous￿ pupil characteristics, to wit,
the household income consists of replacement incomes only, the pupil is living outside the
biological family, the level of education of the mother is low, the pupil￿ s family belongs to a
travelling population and ￿ in combination with one of the former characteristics￿ the home
language is di⁄erent from Dutch. Table 1 contains some summary statistics for both types of
instruction units REG and EEO over the di⁄erent school types in Flanders.1 Overall, local
public schools receive most instruction units (per capita), private schools the least, while the
Flemish public schools are in between both.
Table 1: (Input) REG and EEO instruction units per school type.



































Output is de￿ned on the basis of test scores in three dimensions: mathematics, technical
reading and writing, collected at the end of the second year. All scores are set between 0
and 100. We calculate a language pro￿ciency score as the simple average of the reading
and writing scores. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the mathematics (MATH) and
language pro￿ciency score (DUTCH) for the di⁄erent school types in Flanders. Private
(catholic) schools do best in both tests. They are followed closely by the local public schools
and, at some distance, by the Flemish public schools. Note also that the dispersion in
test scores in the private (catholic) schools is smaller compared to local public schools, and
dispersion in the latter type of schools is in turn smaller compared to Flemish public schools.
Table 2: (Output) MATH and DUTCH per school type.
























1All reported ￿gures in this paper are weighted by the inverse of the sampling probability, to correct for
the non-representative nature of the dataset.
5Pupil environment is measured by three indices: socio-economic status and entry level
in mathematics and language pro￿ciency. Socio-economic status (SES) re￿ ects the cultural,
social and economic environment of the pupil￿ s home. It is calculated as the average of the
following three variables (after standardization): average education level, average professional
status and total income of the parents of the pupil; see Reynders et al. (2005) for details.
The begin level in mathematics (B-MATH) and language pro￿ciency in Dutch (B-DUTCH)
re￿ ect the intellectual antecedents of the pupil, and is equal to the mathematics and language
pro￿ciency score of the pupil at the end of the previous year.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH. We ￿nd that, on
average, private (catholic) schools attract pupils with more ￿ advantageous￿environmental
characteristics compared to local public schools and ￿ to an even greater extent￿ Flemish
public schools. Notice that the di⁄erences in EEO instruction units between the di⁄erent
school types (reported in Table 1) re￿ ect the di⁄erences in SES.
Table 3: (Environment) SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH per school type.



































To summarize, our data roughly con￿rm the widely held belief that private (catholic)
schools in Flanders perform better, while they receive less teaching inputs as a consequence
of their more ￿ advantageous￿pupil population. Our main research question is how we must
assess these output di⁄erences in a fair way, i.e., by taking the di⁄erences in inputs and
environment into account.
3 E¢ ciency measurement: method
Consider a general educational system that is characterized, at the level of the pupil, by p
inputs and q outputs. We denote the corresponding input vector by x 2 IR
p
+, and the output
vector by y 2 IR
q
+; in our application, p = 1 and the input is the sum of the REG and EEO
instruction units, while q = 2 and the outputs are the MATH and DUTCH scores. The set





+ j x can produce y
￿
:
6Educational e¢ ciency analysis relates educational input to educational output. As such,
empirical e¢ ciency evaluation essentially requires two steps: (1) we need to empirically esti-
mate the feasibility set F; (2) we have to evaluate observed e¢ ciency by using an e¢ ciency
measure that has a meaningful interpretation in terms of the underlying educational objec-
tives. These two issues are discussed next. Subsequently, we discuss two additional issues
that will be important for our empirical application: (3) we need to account for outlier ob-
servations in the empirical e¢ ciency evaluation; and (4) we want to correct the observed
e¢ ciency scores for environmental characteristics, which will also allow us to visualize the
impact of the latter on the former.
3.1 Empirical feasibility set
Usually, the ￿ true￿feasibility set F is not observed. To deal with such incomplete information,
the nonparametric approach suggests to start from the set of n observed input-output vectors
S ￿ F (jSj = n); it assumes that observed input-output combinations are certainly feasible
(e.g., Varian, 1984). In addition, we assume that inputs and outputs are freely disposable,
which means:
if (x;y) 2 F then (x0;y0) 2 F for x0 ￿ x and y0 ￿ y:





+ j x0 ￿ x and y0 ￿ y for (x0;y0) 2 S
￿
;
i.e., the free disposal hull (FDH) of the set S (e.g., Deprins et al., 1984; Tulkens, 1993).
We brie￿ y discuss the interpretation of the assumptions that underlie the construction of
b F. First, ￿ free disposability of inputs￿means that more input never implies a decrease of the
(maximally achievable) output. We believe this is a reasonable assumption in the current
context, where inputs stand for instruction units and outputs stand for pupil performance (in
alternative disciplines). Second, ￿ free disposability of outputs￿means that more output never
implies a decrease of the (minimally required) input. Once more, we believe this assumption
is tenable in our speci￿c context.
Finally, the assumption S ￿ F excludes measurement errors and atypical observations,
such that all observed input-output vectors are comparable (or, alternatively, that all relevant
input and output dimensions are included in the analysis). Admittedly, this assumption may
seem problematic in our application, which compares primary pupils that may be charac-
terized by di⁄erent background characteristics (that are not explicitly included in our set of
conditioning/environmental variables; see further: conditional ine¢ ciency measure). There-
fore, as we will explain further on, we will use an e¢ ciency evaluation method that mitigates
the impact of potential outliers within the observed set S.
73.2 Ine¢ ciency measure
Consistent with the usual practice in primary education, we focus on output performance
(see, e.g., Worthington, 2001). Speci￿cally, we use an ine¢ ciency measure which is, for a
given input, equal to the maximally possible output performance minus the actual output
performance. The output performance is measured as a weighted sum of the output perfor-
mances in alternative disciplines (captured by the q constituent components of each output
vector y), which again re￿ ects the usual practice in primary education. Suppose, that we
are to evaluate a pupil observation (xE;yE) 2 S (also referred to as ￿ observation E￿in what
follows) and that the relevant output weights are given by wE 2 IR
q
+. For the empirical




wE ￿ (y ￿ yE)
wE ￿ g
j x 6 xE
￿
;
with g 2 IR
q
+ an aggregation vector that de￿nes the denominator as a weighted sum of the
output weights; we use wE ￿g > 0. For the given input level, the measure takes the di⁄erence
of (linearly aggregated) maximal output performance over actual output performance; this
di⁄erence is normalized by dividing through the weighted sum wE ￿ g. Clearly, 1 > ￿E ￿ 0.
E¢ ciency implies ￿E = 0; and higher ine¢ ciency values generally reveals more ine¢ ciency.
In our application, we set the aggregation vector g equal to a q-dimensional vector of ones,
which implies that the denominator is simply the (equally weighted) sum of weights. We
believe this speci￿cation of g is appropriate in our application context because the outputs
(MATH and DUTCH) are measured in a comparable measurement unit: it naturally corrects
for the scale of the output weights wE (i.e. ￿wE obtains the same results as wE for all ￿ > 0),
while treating the (directly comparable) output dimensions identically. But it should be clear
that, in general, our method also allows for other speci￿cations of g, which accounts for the
possibility that di⁄erent outputs are expressed in di⁄erent measurement units.2
The measure ￿E assumes that the weighting vector wE is ￿xed a priori. Our following
application will focus on an alternative ine¢ ciency measure that allows for ￿ exible weighting.
Speci￿cally, for each pupil observation we choose ￿ most favorable￿weights b wE that maximize
the e¢ ciency of the input-output vector under evaluation; this conveniently allows for ￿ spe-
cialization￿in learning: e.g. if a pupil performs relatively well in mathematics, then this
discipline gets a relatively high weight in her/his ine¢ ciency measure. To avoid undesirable
￿ extreme￿specialization, we impose that the endogenously selected relative output weights
b wE should respect upper and lower bounds, which are captured by the set WE ￿ IR
q
+ char-
acterized in terms of linear constraints (b wE 2 WE satisfying b wE ￿ g > 0). (The construction
2In this respect, it is also worth indicating that, for general g, the ￿ empirical￿ine¢ ciency measure b ￿E
(cfr. infra) is formally similar to the so-called ￿ directional distance function￿ ; see, for example, the duality
results in Chambers et al. (1998, p. 358). These authors also provide a discussion on possible speci￿cations
of g; while they focus on pro￿t e¢ ciency, the analogy with our setting is straightforward.
8of WE for our empirical application is discussed in the beginning of section 4.) This yields
the empirical ine¢ ciency measure





b wE ￿ (y ￿ yE)
b wE ￿ g
j x 6 xE
￿
:
Clearly, for wE 2 WE we have ￿E ￿ b ￿E ￿ 0. The measure b ￿E, with endogenously de￿ned
most favorable weights, has a directly similar interpretation as the measure ￿E, with a priori
￿xed weights wE.
To conclude, we note that the empirical ine¢ ciency measure can be computed by simple
linear programming. Speci￿cally, given the construction of b F, the computation proceeds
in two steps. The ￿rst step identi￿es the set of observations that dominate the evaluated
observation in input terms:
DE = f(x;y) 2 S j x 6 xEg:
The second step involves the linear programming problem. As a preliminary note, we
recall that b wE ￿ g > 0 in the above de￿nition of b ￿E, so that we can use the normalization
b wE ￿ g = 1 (because the set WE only restricts the relative output weights). As such, we can
compute





u ￿ b wE ￿ yE j
b wE ￿ g = 1
u ￿ b wE ￿ y 8y : (x;y) 2 DE





This is a linear programming problem given that the set WE is characterized by linear con-
straints. For general WE, the fact that merely linear programming is required for the com-
putation of the empirical ine¢ ciency measure b ￿E (after a trivial check of input dominance)
makes it attractive for practical applications.
3.3 Outlier-robust ine¢ ciency measure
To mitigate the impact of (potential) outlier behavior in the observed sample S, we use the
order-m method as suggested by Cazals et al. (2002); we adapt the method for the speci￿c
ine¢ ciency measure b ￿E de￿ned above. Essentially, in terms of the terminology introduced
above, this boils down to repeatedly drawing (with replacement) R subsamples D
r;m
E (r = 1;
:::; R) from the dominating set DE; each subsample D
r;m
E contains m (> 1) input-output
vectors that are selected from DE, i.e. D
r;m
E ￿ DE and jDr
Ej = m.3 For each D
r;m
E we
3Remark that, to correct for the non-representative nature of our dataset, we take the probability of
drawing a pupil proportional to the inverse of the probability that this pupil appears in the sample due to the
speci￿c sampling design. A similar quali￿cation applies to the environment-corrected ine¢ ciency measure
where we weight the Kernel functions by the inverse of the sampling probability.








u ￿ b wE ￿ yE j
b wE ￿ g = 1
u ￿ b wE ￿ y 8y : (x;y) 2 D
r;m
E





which again uses linear programming. Subsequently, the outlier-robust order-m ine¢ ciency










Referring to Cazals et al. (2002), this measure has attractive statistical properties and con-
veniently mitigates outlier behavior. See also Simar (2003) for a related discussion.4 As a
￿nal note, because it can well be that (xE;yE) = 2 D
r;m
E , we can have e ￿
r;m
E < 0. We will label
such observation as ￿ super-e¢ cient￿in what follows.
3.4 Environment-corrected ine¢ ciency measure
To capture environmental e⁄ects, we use the procedure outlined by Daraio and Simar (2005,
2007). Like before, we adapt this method to the speci￿c ine¢ ciency measure under consid-
eration.
Suppose we want to take up k environmental characteristics, which corresponds to a k-
dimensional vector z of environmental indicators associated with each input-output vector
(x;y); in our application, k = 3 and the vector z captures SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH. For
the evaluated observation E, the Daraio-Simar procedure computes an environment-corrected
ine¢ ciency measure by conditioning on the corresponding value zE of the environmental
vector: it selects input-output vectors (x;y) 2 DE with z in the neighborhood of zE. This
gives us the conditional ine¢ ciency measure





u ￿ b wE ￿ yE j
b wE ￿ g = 1
u ￿ b wE ￿ y 8y : (x;y) 2 DE(zE)





with DE(zE) = f(x;y) 2 DE j jzE ￿ zj ￿ hg and h a Kernel bandwidth vector. In our appli-
cation, when the number of conditioning variables k is larger than 1, we ￿rst apply a so-called
Mahalanobis transformation to decorrelate the environmental variables (see, e.g., Mardia et
al., 1979). Afterwards, we perform a sequential Kernel estimation ￿ as if all environmental
variables were independently distributed￿ to compute the optimal bandwidth vector (via
4Cazals et al. (2002) actually consider an e¢ ciency measure that does not consider linear but monotonic
aggregation of the outputs. But their main results carry over to the linear variant that we consider. A similar
quali￿cation applies for our use of the procedure of Daraio and Simar (2005) to account for environmental
e⁄ects in the e¢ ciency evaluation exercise. In fact, these authors also focus on input e¢ ciency, while we
translate their procedure towards output e¢ ciency.
10the likelihood cross-validation criterion) and the probability weights used to draw the sample
of size m.
4 E¢ ciency measurement: application
In this section, we focus on visualizing the impact of the environmental variables SES, B-
MATH and B-DUTCH on educational e¢ ciency at the pupil level, by using the outlier-
robust order-m ine¢ ciency measures described in the previous section. For these measures,
an additional consideration concerns the speci￿cation of the paramaters R (the number of
drawings with replacement) and m (the number of input-output vectors selected from DE in
each drawing). In the following, we discuss empirical results for R = 50 and m = 100 as, from
these values on, the number of super-e¢ cient observations (see supra) in the sample is robust
at around 1%; the same criteria is used by Daraio and Simar (2007). Still, at this point it
is worth stressing that we have also experimented with other values for R (R = 10;25;100)
and m (m = 10;25;50;125;150); these alternative con￿gurations generally obtained the same
qualitative conclusions. For compactness, we do not include all these results in the current
paper, but they are available from the authors upon simple request.
As discussed before, our application avoids ￿ extreme￿specialization in either DUTCH
or MATH by focusing on a restricted set WE ￿ IR
q
+ (with q = 2), which captures upper
and lower bounds of the relative output weights. To construct these bounds, we divide the
number of hours spent on DUTCH in the classroom by the sum of the number of instruction
hours spent on DUTCH and MATH. This re￿ ects the weight attached to DUTCH (relative
to MATH) in the second year of primary education. The average equals 0.54 ￿ and is very
similar for the di⁄erent school types￿ while the 1 and 99-percentile values equal 0.44 and
0.71, respectively. These 1 and 99-percentile values will serve as (relative) weight restrictions
for DUTCH (and hence 0.56 and 0.29 for MATH). To check sensitivity of our main results
with respect to this particular speci￿cation of WE, we have also considered extreme scenarios
with no weight ￿ exibility (i.e. using 0.50 as a ￿xed weight for the two outputs DUTCH
and MATH) and full weight ￿ exibility (i.e. WE = IR
q
+, with b wE ￿ g = 1 for b wE 2 WE).
Our main qualitative results appeared to be robust for these alternative weight bounds; the
corresponding results will not be reported in the current paper, but they are available from
the authors upon simple request.
4.1 Outlier-robust ine¢ ciency measures
Before visualizing the impact of the di⁄erent environmental variables under study, Table 4
provides summary statistics for alternative outlier-robust order-m ine¢ ciency measures. We
report results for the full sample (see the column ￿ all￿ ) and for the subsamples that correspond
to the di⁄erent school types (private schools, local public schools and Flemish public schools).
11Table 4: Some summary statistics for the robust ine¢ ciency measures.
school type all private public
environment local Flemish
; average 26.99 25.74 27.68 31.61
std. dev. 13.85 13.28 13.78 15.49
minimum -5.70 -3.50 -3.67 -5.70
maximum 74.10 74.03 74.10 71.39
SES average 26.97 25.39 27.43 31.17
std. dev. 13.80 13.25 13.78 15.27
minimum -3.02 -2.85 -3.02 -2.34
maximum 75.96 73.45 75.96 70.03
B-MATH average 24.17 23.00 25.12 27.88
std. dev. 12.34 11.87 12.28 13.62
minimum -5.74 -5.42 -4.92 -5.74
maximum 72.46 61.63 71.52 72.46
B-DUTCH average 23.61 22.61 24.34 27.04
std. dev. 12.35 11.80 12.39 14.03
minimum -6.54 -1.37 -6.54 -0.86
maximum 65.41 62.88 65.41 60.09
B-MATH, B-DUTCH & SES average 17.18 16.34 18.52 18.70
std. dev. 10.16 9.78 10.35 11.04
minimum -17.52 -1.99 -17.52 -3.39
maximum 55.14 49.72 55.14 53.43
Let us ￿rst regard the unconditional ine¢ ciency values (with environment = ;). Table
4 reports an average ine¢ ciency score of 26.99 over all pupils in our sample. In words, the
average pupil achieves an output level that is 26.99 points below the best possible performance
for (at most) the same amount of instruction units (= REG + EEO = input). To interpret
this result, we recall that aggregate output performance is measured as a weighted sum
of the output performance in the disciplines MATH and DUTCH (using ￿ most favorable￿
weights for each individual pupil), and that the MATH and DUTCH scores are both set
between 0 and 100. As such, this average shortage of 26.99 points should be compared
to a (￿ theoretical￿ ) maximum possible shortage of 100 points. Next, we also observe much
variation in the e¢ ciency scores over pupils. For example, the standard deviation in the
ine¢ ciency values is 13.85; and the maximum ine¢ ciency value amounts to 74.10 points,
while the minimum value equals -5.70.5 Finally, we ￿nd di⁄erences in the distributions for
di⁄erent school types; for example, the average ine¢ ciency value for private schools (25.74)
5We recall that negative ine¢ ciency values are possible for super-e¢ cient observations because we focus
on outlier-robust ine¢ ciency measures.
12is below that for local public schools (27.68), which in turn is below that for Flemish public
schools (31.61).
In the following, we investigate to what extent these patterns in the distribution of the in-
e¢ ciency scores can be attributed to environmental di⁄erences, as captured by the variables
SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH. The summary statistics in Table 4 provide some prelimi-
nary insights. We ￿rst consider the separate impact of the social and cultural environment
of a pupil￿ s home (captured by SES) and the cognitive antecedents of the pupil (captured
by B-MATH and B-DUTCH). As expected, we ￿nd that all three variables in￿ uence the
pupils￿e¢ ciency values; for example, when focusing on the full sample (see the column ￿ all￿ ),
average ine¢ ciency reduces to 26.97, 24.17 and 23.61 when controlling for, respectively, SES,
B-MATH, and B-DUTCH. In addition, we observe a decrease in the variation of the ine¢ -
ciency values; for example, the standard deviation reduces to 13.80, 12.34 and 12.35 when
conditioning on, respectively, SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH. This indicates that each indi-
vidual variable can explain the observed variation in the ine¢ ciency values to some extent.
Finally, if we simultaneously control for SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH, we observe a fur-
ther and rather substantial decrease of the average ine¢ ciency value (to 17.18 for ￿ all￿ ) as
well as the standard deviation of ine¢ ciency values (to 10.16 for ￿ all￿ ). This suggests that
simultaneous consideration of all three environmental variables can e⁄ectively yield addi-
tional ￿ explanatory￿value in terms of explaining patterns of educational ine¢ ciency. The
same general conclusions hold for all three school types (private schools, local public schools
and Flemish public schools). Remark, ￿nally, that for all speci￿cations of the conditioning
variables that we consider, private schools are, on average, more e¢ cient than both types of
public schools, and that local public schools outperform Flemish public schools.
4.2 Environmental e⁄ects
To visualize environmental e⁄ects and, consequently, to detect whether an environmental
variable is favorable or unfavorable, we adapt Daraio and Simar (2007)￿ s methodology to our
setting. If z
￿j
E denotes the vector of all conditioning variables, except for the j-th entry, and
z
j










on the observed values for z
j
E. If, for a certain range, the regression is decreasing, the j-th
environmental variable is unfavorable to e¢ ciency, behaving as a ￿ substitutive￿output in the
educational process. Conversely, an increasing curve indicates a favorable variable that plays
the role of a ￿ substitutive￿input in the educational process. Finally, a ￿ at curve suggests














































































































































Figure 1: (Environmental impact) SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH.
Figure 1 visualizes the environmental e⁄ects. We ￿rst consider the variable SES. Gen-
erally, we ￿nd a positive ￿rst order e⁄ect of SES on the educational e¢ ciency for low SES
14values, and a negative ￿rst order e⁄ect for high SES values. The full line suggests a negative
second order e⁄ect. Still, the e⁄ect for high SES values is not very pronounced; in fact,
the observation points are widely scattered around the full line. We infer that, while SES
admittedly has some (positive) e⁄ect on educational e¢ ciency, much of this e⁄ect is already
captured by the other two variables B-MATH and B-DUTCH, which causes the residual
impact of SES to be rather low.
Let us then regard the variable B-MATH. Figure 1 reveals a positive monotonic ￿rst order
impact and a generally negative second order e⁄ect. Taken together, this indicates that, on
average, a higher B-MATH value predicts a higher educational e¢ ciency, but the marginal
impact decreases when the B-MATH value increases. Compared to the SES picture, the
observation points are much more narrowly scattered around the full line, which provides
more convincing support for this residual B-MATH e⁄ect.
Finally, we consider the variable B-DUTCH. The general conclusions drawn from Figure
1 are similar to those for B-MATH: there is a clearly positive monotonic ￿rst order e⁄ect;
and, generally, a negative second order e⁄ect, which is now even more pronounced than in
the B-MATH case. As before, we infer that, on average, a higher B-DUTCH value leads
to a higher educational e¢ ciency, but the marginal impact decreases when the B-DUTCH
score increases (in casu, at a relatively rapid rate). The fact that the observation points are
narrowly scattered around the full line implies quite strong support for this conclusion.
The overall conclusion, which falls in line with our prior expectations, is that each of
the environmental variables positively impacts the educational e¢ ciency (see the ￿rst order
e⁄ects), and that this positive e⁄ect prevails in particular for low initial values for SES,
B-MATH and B-DUTCH (see the second order e⁄ects). Although we ￿nd stronger e⁄ects
for B-MATH and B-DUTCH than for SES, we believe that our results provide su¢ ciently
strong support for simultaneously conditioning on all three variables when comparing the
educational e¢ ciency for di⁄erent pupils. Therefore, our aggregation exercise in the next
section will mainly focus on such fully conditioned educational e¢ ciency values.
5 Aggregation: e¢ ciency versus equity
This section aims to compare the aggregate e¢ ciency and equity performance of private
schools, local public schools and Flemish public schools. Speci￿cally, we start with the
pupils￿ine¢ ciency values and the corresponding optimal weights that underlie the results
presented in the previous section. Using these pupil-speci￿c weights to aggregate DUTCH
and MATH, we obtain what we will call the ￿ actual score￿ . Adding the ine¢ ciency score
to it, we get the so-called ￿ potential score￿ . It follows from our previous discussion that
these actual and potential scores correct for input di⁄erences (in terms of REG and EEO
instruction units), and avoid extreme specialization in DUTCH or MATH (through weight
bounds). In addition, given that we focus on order-m ine¢ ciency measures, it also accounts
15for possible outlier behavior. Finally, the use of conditional ine¢ ciency measures corrects for
environmental di⁄erences (in terms of SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH).
Once we have derived distributions of actual and potential scores for the pupils in di⁄erent
school types, we investigate whether one school type is ￿ better￿than another in a robust way,
i.e., without assuming a speci￿c parametric functional form to aggregate outcomes. To do so,
we focus on First-order and Second-order Stochastic Dominance (FSD and SSD), two popular
nonparametric dominance criteria in the risk and welfare literature. We start with FSD, and
show how we can adjust it to correct for input and environmental di⁄erences between school
types. Since we obtain inconclusive results, we next present SSD, which turns out to be a
more powerful dominance criterion in the current setting.
5.1 Only e¢ ciency matters: FSD
FSD can be characterized by the intuitive Pareto e¢ ciency principle, which states that higher
outcomes are always better. In words, one school type, say A, is better than another school
type, say B, according to FSD, denoted A %1 B, if and only if welfare (denoted by W),
measured by the average utility, is higher in A than in B for all increasing (di⁄erentiable)
utility functions. Formally, for U1 = fU : R ! RjU0 ￿ 0g the set of all increasing utility
functions, we get






UdFB ￿ 0, for all U in U1,
with FA and FB the distribution functions of the actual scores for two school types. Using
integration by parts, we obtain the following equivalent, implementable condition
A %1 B , FA (y) ￿ FB (y) ￿ 0, for all y 2 R+; (1)
see, e.g., Lambert (2001). Notice that FSD is a robust ranking criterion, since it holds for all
speci￿cations of U within U1 (i.e. ￿ all utilitarians with increasing utility functions agree￿ ).
Still, it comes at a cost, since two distributions might turn out to be non-comparable.
Importantly, equation (1) does not take di⁄erences in inputs and school environment into
account and would therefore be a rather blunt approach to assess school types. One way to
correct for this, is to focus on the welfare di⁄erence between what is actually achieved (via












AjZ is the distribution function of potential scores of the pupils in school type A
conditional upon ￿ inputs￿x and ￿ environment￿z, collected in Z = fx;zg. Generally, higher
values for ￿WAjZ suggest better performance, as they indicate that ￿ in aggregate welfare
terms￿ the school type comes closer to potential achievement (while accounting for the given
input and the environmental characteristics of the pupil population).
16Given this, let A %1jZ B denote that school type A is better than B according to FSD,
corrected for ine¢ ciency, measured conditionally upon Z; we get
A %1jZ B , ￿WAjZ ￿ ￿WBjZ ￿ 0, for all U in U1.
As before, using integration by parts, this equation can be equivalently expressed as
A %1jZ B ,
￿










￿ 0, for all y 2 R+. (2)
Rewriting this equation, it consists of two components: a term FA (y) ￿ FB (y) which is
the same as in equation (1), and a term F
pot
BjZ (y) ￿ F
pot
AjZ (y) which can be interpreted as
the correction term. The following two simple examples illustrate the basic intuition. First,
suppose that both school types are equally e¢ cient, but have a very di⁄erent pupil population
in terms of z. In that case, the correction term F
pot
BjZ (y) ￿ F
pot
AjZ (y) tends to be equal to
FB (y)￿FA (y) and will mitigate the ￿rst term FA (y)￿FB (y). Second, suppose both school
types have the same inputs and the same environment for each pupil, but one school is better
than the other in terms of actual scores, i.e. FA (y) ￿ FB (y) ￿ 0 everywhere. In this case,
the correction term F
pot
BjZ (y) ￿ F
pot
AjZ (y) tends to zero and only the di⁄erences in the actual
scores will play a role in assessing both school types.
Table 5 presents our results for the corrected FSD criterion in (2). We consider two
extreme cases in terms of the speci￿cation of Z: the ￿rst case (Z = fREG+EEO;;g) does
account for input di⁄erences but not for environmental di⁄erences (i.e., it is based on the
unconditional ine¢ ciency measure e ￿
m
E, which coincides with e ￿E (zE) for zE empty); the
second case (Z = fREG+EEO;SES,B-MATH,B-DUTCHg) simultaneously takes account of
input and all three environmental variables (i.e., it is based on the measure e ￿E (zE), with
zE capturing SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH). For each case, Table 5 reports the dominance
relation between the row school type and the column school type: either the row school
type ￿ dominates￿or ￿ is dominated by￿the column type, or the row type is not comparable
to (￿ not comp. to￿ ) the column type. Two remarks are in order. First, following the usual
practice, dominance is checked at 10 data points (equally spread over the common grid of
both distributions), rather than at all points y 2 R+. Second, we use a naive bootstrap
procedure for statistical inference. That is, we calculate the proportion of the total number
of bootstraps, i.e., 10000 drawings with replacement from the original sample, in which a
certain result (￿ dominates￿ , ￿ is dominated by￿ , or ￿ not comp. to￿ ) was found.6 In Table 5 we
mention the most frequent result together with the corresponding ￿ naive￿p-value, i.e., the
proportion of times this result was found.
In terms of average test scores, we saw before that private schools outperform local public
schools, while the latter in turn outperform Flemish public schools. Still, the results in Table
5, which pertain to the more robust FSD concept, do not allow us to conclude that one
school type outperforms another in a signi￿cant way (i.e., using a naive p-value > 0.95,
6Notice that, from 5000 bootstrap samples onwards, the results remain stable.
17which corresponds to a 5% signi￿cance level); in fact, this result holds for both (extreme)
speci￿cations of Z that we consider.
Table 5: Corrected FSD results.
Z = {REG+EEO;;} {REG+EEO;SES,B-MATH,B-DUTCH}













5.2 Equity also matters: SSD
We next include a preference for equality in addition to Pareto e¢ ciency in our comparison
of the aggregate performance of di⁄erent school types. The SSD criterion simultaneously
assesses e¢ ciency and equity in a robust way. This dominance criterion can be characterized
by the principle that higher outcomes are better (Pareto e¢ ciency) and, additionally, the
principle that more equal outcomes are better (Pigou-Dalton principle), i.e., more weight to
lower scores. As a consequence, SSD is a necessary condition for FSD and leads to a more
complete binary relation. According to SSD, school type A is better than school type B,
denoted A %2 B, if and only if welfare (denoted by W, and again measured by the average
utility) is higher in A than in B for all increasing and concave (twice di⁄erentiable) utility
functions. Let U2 = fU : R ! RjU0 ￿ 0 & U00 ￿ 0g the set of increasing and concave utility
functions; we get
A %2 B , WA ￿ WB =
Z 1
0
U (x)dFA (x) ￿
Z 1
0
U (x)dFB (x) ￿ 0, for all U in U2.
Twice integrating by parts leads to the equivalent condition
A %2 B ,
Z y
0
(FA (x) ￿ FB (x))dx ￿ 0, for all y 2 R+; (3)
see again Lambert (2001).
Analogous to before, we propose a corrected version of the criterion in (3): A %2jZ B
means that school type A is better than B according to SSD, conditional upon inputs x and
environment z, collected in Z = fx;zg. Formally, it is de￿ned as
A %2jZ B , ￿WAjZ ￿ ￿WBjZ ￿ 0, for all U in U2;
and this dominance condition can be equivalently expressed as














dx ￿ 0, for all y 2 R+; (4)
18the interpretation is directly analogous to that of (2).
Table 6 presents our results. The interpretation of the di⁄erent entries is similar to that of
Table 5, but now pertains to the SSD criterion in (4). Interestingly, we now do ￿nd signi￿cant
dominance relations, which is in sharp contrast to the FSD results in Table 5. If we consider
the right column as the most fair comparison, then private schools signi￿cantly dominate
public schools, while we cannot distinguish between the two types of public schools in a
signi￿cant way. Note also that conditioning the e¢ ciency scores plays a role when comparing
both types of public schools.
Table 6: Corrected SSD results.
Z = {REG+EEO;;} {REG+EEO;SES,B-MATH,B-DUTCH}














Focusing on educational e¢ ciency, we have presented a nonparametric approach for ana-
lyzing public sector e¢ ciency which also accounts for equity considerations. First, we have
designed a nonparametric (DEA) model that is specially tailored for educational e¢ ciency
evaluation at the pupil level. It requires minimal a priori structure regarding the educational
feasibility set and objectives. This is particularly convenient in the current context, which
typically involves minimal a priori information. Next, we have argued that the First-order
and Second-order stochastic dominance (FSD and SSD) criteria are particularly well-suited
for comparing the educational e¢ ciency of di⁄erent school types; these nonparametric dom-
inance criteria for comparing aggregate (school type) e¢ ciency naturally complement our
nonparametric model for evaluating individual (pupil level) e¢ ciency. FSD is the appro-
priate criterion if only (Pareto) e¢ ciency matters. By contrast, the more powerful SSD
criterion is recommendable when (Pigou-Dalton) equity is important in addition to (Pareto)
e¢ ciency; such equity considerations are usually prevalent in the context of public sector
e¢ ciency evaluation. We have shown that our approach directly allows for adapting the
methodology of Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007), to account for potential outlier behavior and
environmental characteristics (in casu the pupils￿educational environment) in the e¢ ciency
assessment. Although our application concentrates on educational e¢ ciency, we believe that
the presented approach is also more generally useful for e¢ ciency evaluation in the public
sector: such evaluation often (1) involves little a priori information about the underlying
19feasibility set and objectives, and (2) focuses on comparisons of the aggregate e¢ ciency of
di⁄erent groups, in which (3) equity considerations are important.
Our application demonstrates the practical usefulness of our approach. First, we have
investigated the impact of the ￿ environmental characteristics￿socio-economic status (SES),
and begin-level in mathematics (B-MATH) and language pro￿ciency (B-DUTCH) on the
educational e¢ ciency for individual pupils. In line with our prior expectations, we ￿nd that
all three environmental variables have a positive ￿rst-order e⁄ect on educational e¢ ciency:
on average, higher SES, B-MATH or B-DUTCH values systematically entail higher educa-
tional e¢ ciency for individual pupils; although for high SES values, the ￿rst-order e⁄ect is
negative. In addition, we ￿nd that the (average) second order e⁄ects are always negative
and more pronounced for low values of the environmental variables, which suggests that
the positive ￿rst-order e⁄ect prevails in particular when the initial SES, B-MATH and B-
DUTCH status is low. Although we ￿nd stronger e⁄ects for B-MATH and B-DUTCH than
for SES, we believe that our results convincingly support that all three environmental vari-
ables should simultaneously be accounted for to obtain a fair e¢ ciency evaluation. Next, we
have compared the aggregate e¢ ciency of private schools, local public schools and Flemish
public schools. Focusing on FSD, we ￿nd that no school type robustly dominates another
school type; we conclude ￿ non-comparability￿in all pairwise comparisons. However, the story
changes dramatically if we focus on SSD. When accounting for the diverging environmental
characteristics of the pupil populations, we ￿nd that private schools signi￿cantly dominate
both types of public schools. In addition, our results suggest that local public schools out-
perform Flemish public schools, but this result is not supported in a signi￿cant way. These
results are in line with the seminal work of Coleman et al. (1982) and are consistent with the
mainstream literature. Given that our aggregate e¢ ciency comparisons account for both eq-
uity and environment, we consider them as most fair in the (public sector) evaluation context
under study.
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